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During the second term of President Leonid Kuchma (1999–2004) Ukraine faced a 
serious decline in civil rights, rule of law, and fair government. Political scandals around 
journalist Heorhiy Gongadze’s murder and the intimidation of political opposition and 
independent media resulted in growing social dissatisfaction with the state institutions. At 
the same time, Ukrainian politics were shaped by the new strong non- leftist opposition, 
which presented an alternate view for modernization of the Ukrainian state and nation in 
conformity with European and democratic values. The main branch of this opposition, the 
“Our Ukraine” block led by former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko, included not only 
traditional national-democratic opposition but also former state executives who protested 
Kuchma’s crony capitalism and corruption. In the 2002 parliamentary elections Our 
Ukraine won the first slot on the party slates. Having put pressure on the deputies of the 
Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada), Kuchma managed to form a slim pro-
presidential majority. Nevertheless, Yushchenko emerged as the leading candidate in the 
2004 presidential race.  
Configuration of Forces in the Campaign 
For many years, Ukraine’s opposition stood in favor of limiting the power of the 
Ukrainian President. After the 2002 parliamentary elections Kuchma’s supporters not 
only formally embraced the idea of constitutional reform, but even envisaged the creation 
of a parliamentary republic with a powerful prime minister and nominal president. From 
their side it was a tactical step; in the case of Yushchenko’s victory he would become a 
weak president while, as some analysts suggested, Kuchma (or one of his close 
supporters) might become a new powerful prime minister.  
However, since the failure of the April 8, 2004 vote on the Constitutional 
Amendment Act, the Ukrainian elite have been preparing for the imminent fight for the 
presidency and speculating on who Leonid Kuchma would nominate as his political 
successor. Each oligarchic clan, namely the Kyiv, Dnipropetrovs’k, and Donets’k clans, 
hoped that Kuchma would anoint their leader as his “heir.”  
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In April 2004 Viktor Yanukovych, the prime minister and representative of the 
Donets’k clan, had the highest personal rating (10-15 percent according to different 
sociological surveys) among politicians loyal to Kuchma (primarily because of his 
administrative position). His criminal past, however, especially his two terms of 
imprisonment, weakened his position and made him dependent on kompromat.  The 
kompromat acted as strong strings that controlled his future political actions and 
guaranteed the security of Kuchma and his entourage. Moreover, Yanukovych supported 
Kuchma’s ideas of strengthening ties within the Single Economic Space proposed by 
Moscow.  Viktor Medvedchuk, head of the presidential staff and oligarchic Social 
Democratic Party of Ukraine (United), had to ally with Yanukovych after the failure of 
the constitutional reform. Still, Medvedchuk did not give up on his idea of constitutional 
change and even persuaded Kuchma that adoption of the constitutional amendments 
should be the main condition for Yanukovych to receive the powerful backing from the 
state bureaucracy. Medvedchuk alone controlled governors in six regions with almost six 
million voters or 15 percent of the Ukrainian electoral body. He was also considered to be 
a shadow ruler behind the decisions of the powerful heads of Internal Affairs, the 
Security Service and the Tax Administration. Medvedchuk’s support was vital for any 
candidate as he owned or managed three nationwide popular television channels. He was 
notorious for introducing the practice of temniki (instructions for how to cover up and 
ignore events) to all Ukrainian mass media.    
Another influential group, with Viktor Pinchuk (Kuchma’s son-in- law) at the top, was 
elaborating plans for personal “safety nets” for the president and his family. In addition to 
constitutional reform, Pinchuk looked to establishing contacts with the West and 
organizing visits of retired high-ranked U.S. officials, such as former President George 
Bush, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, General 
Wesley Clark, and billionaire George Soros.  
The authorities tried to split the opposition forces. However, this tactic was not 
successful enough. Yulia Tymoshenko, former vice prime minister in Yushchenko’s 
government, sided with Yushchenko in founding the coalition “Strength of the People”. 
Later, the idea of creating a new parliamentary coalition and a new “government of 
people’s trust” was put forward. After Yushchenko won the first round of voting on 
October 31st, centrist political forces such as former prime minister Anatoly Kinakh 
(Party of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs of Ukraine), the People’s Agrarian Party 
(headed by speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn, though he formally decided not to take sides), 
the “Democratic Platform” of People’s Democratic Party, the faction “Center,” and the 
Green Party decided to join Yushchenko’s initiative.   
On the left, the Socialist party (SPU) was struggling for the brand of the “main left 
force” with the Communists. Head of the SPU Oleksandr Moroz (former speaker and a 
staunch critic of Kuchma) claimed that his participation in the campaign gave people real 
choice, whereas Symonenko presented the Soviet past; Yanukovych, the power of 
criminal clans; and Yushchenko, the power of big business. At the same time, many 
supporters of the SPU pragmatically voted for Yushchenko because of his greater 
chances to defeat Yanukovych. Therefore, on the eve of the run-off Moroz signed an 
agreement with Yushchenko. It was an important symbol, as Yushchenko received 
support from the center- left. 
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The Communist leader, Petro Symonenko, accused both Yushchenko and 
Yanukovych of being “puppets” of the oligarchic clans, though his strongest criticism 
was aimed at Yushchenko. Thus, the Communists once again played into the hands of the 
existing regime. The results of the first round were a devastating blow to the 
Communists. Symonenko got only 5 percent, and for the first time the Socialist candidate 
was ahead with 6 percent of the votes. In the run-off the Communists declared their 
neutrality, although many communists, especially in the eastern and southern regions, 
favored the prime minister for his pro-Russian policies. 
The Stakes: Democracy and Sovereignty vs. a “Corrupted, 
Criminal Regime” 
Throughout the election campaign, the presidential administration tried in every way 
possible to stop Yushchenko from winning the elections. Kuchma himself “predicted” 
that it would be the dirtiest campaign in Ukrainian history. In early April 2004, a conflict 
was staged during the mayoral elections in the small town of Mukachevo 
(Transcarpathian oblast), where both criminals and law enforcement agencies directly 
interfered with the electoral process, stealing the victory from the Our Ukraine candidate.  
Ruthless and illegal actions in Mukachevo pushed the parliament to issue a special 
statement. About a dozen deputies announced their departure from the pro-government 
majority, thus breaking Kuchma’s control over the parliament. It helped the opposition 
prevent another attempt to change the Constitution.  
In response, Medvedchuk imposed even more severe censorship on major Ukrainian 
TV-channels. Pressure then mounted on the only free TV company, Channel 5. Since 
August there have been attempts to block Channe l 5 from its regional audience by 
intimidating its partner broadcasting and cable companies.  In October, Channel 5 was 
sued by one of the deputies and its major bank accounts were frozen. The fate of the 
channel was saved by dozens of journalists conducting a hunger strike and wide public 
protests which led to the reversal of this decision.  
The main card played by Medvedchuk and Yanukovych involved presenting 
Yushchenko as a radical nationalist who was going to oppress the Russian-speaking 
population, whereas Yanukovych was portrayed as a decent public servant and a great 
friend of Russia. Russian and Ukrainian consultants to Yanukovych started to promote 
the idea of a schism in Ukraine between the “nationalistic” West and “industrial” East.    
According to the Russian magazine Profile, Moscow directly contributed a half 
billion dollars to the Yanukovych campaign. Also, Russian President Vladimir Putin 
agreed to restructure $800 million of Ukrainian debt for purchased gas and decided to 
repeal value-added taxes on oil exports to Ukraine starting January 1, 2005. Moreover, on 
October 26th, five days before the first round of voting, Putin made a visit to Kyiv and 
praised Yanukovych’s government. To support Yanukovych before the run-off on 
November 21st, the Russian Duma adopted a law weakening control of Ukrainians 
traveling to Russia. Also, President Putin ordered the preparation of legal documents to 
introduce the prospect of dual citizenship between Russia and Ukraine – another electoral 
promise made by Yanukovych.  
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In September 2004, Russian influence increased after the opening in Kyiv of a 
“Russian Club,” which became a cover for the presence of Gleb Pavlovskiy and other 
Russian consultants in Ukraine. The “Russian Club” was opened to publicize the results 
of opinion polls, which showed Yanukovych’s rating rising without giving information 
about the methodology of the survey. It also organized dubious alternative exit-polls in 
the first and second rounds that declared Yanukovych the winner. 
The most dramatic moment of the campaign happened in early September when 
Yushchenko was hospitalized in Vienna and had to quit active campaigning until the 
middle of October. Our Ukraine blamed authorities for poisoning Yushchenko. 
Authorities responded with an even more brutal falsification campaign. The head of the 
news service at the ICTV channel (controlled by Pinchuk), Dmitrii Kiselyov, a Russian 
citizen, directly participated in this campaign, thus violating Ukrainian electoral law.  
The Western influence was not directed at supporting a particular candidate but rather 
at monitoring the electoral process. The United States, the European Union, the 
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Council of Europe, and a 
number of western NGOs sent hundreds of observers to watch the elections. The United 
States gave messages of warning to Ukrainian authorities that in case of mass fraud it 
could impose sanctions on certain Ukrainian politicians responsible for unlawful 
decisions. To support the point, the State Department refused to issue a visa to Hryhoriy 
Surkis, the closest partner of Viktor Medvedchuk. 
 Despite a controlled mass media and the use of administrative resources, the 
opposition was successful both in depicting Yanukovych as a mere continuation of 
Kuchma’s regime and in disseminating information about Yanukovych’s criminal past 
and irresponsible economic policy, which ended with sharp growth in prices of gasoline 
and food. On the other hand, the Yushchenko team declared its desire to get rid of “state 
capture” by clans, to decrease the administrative pressure on businesses, abolish the tax 
police, and lighten the tax burden. Thus, small and medium business supported 
Yushchenko.  
According to exit polls conducted by the respected Kyiv International Institute of 
Sociology and the Razumkov Center, Yushchenko won the victory by 7 percent in the 
first round and by 9 percent in the run-off. However, fraud was widely used, and after the 
first round the Central Election Commisson (CEC) counted the votes for 10 days (!) 
before recognizing Yushchenko’s victory (the official result was 39.87 percent against 
39.32 percent for Yanukovych). On November 24, the CEC declared Yanukovych the 
winner in the run-off (49.56 percent against 46.61 percent). Thus, the changes in favor of 
Yanukovych comprised 11percent, and in total – 17.4 percent!  
Culmination: the “Orange Revolution” 
The live-broadcast session of the CEC on November 24, which named Yanukovych the 
winner after obvious and cynical violations, only increased the scope of the protests.  It is 
no secret that the opposition knew about the possibility of such a scenario and was 
prepared to call people to streets. But even Yushchenko and Tymoshenko did not expect 
such massive non-stop rallies all over Ukraine, which combined the celebration of the 
“orange” victory (the color of Yushchenko) with protests against falsifications. The civil 
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movement against falsifications was joined by the protests of journalists against 
manipulation and censorship, and the policy of the main television channels changed to 
more balanced coverage.     
 When the protests started, the authorities did not manage to provoke the crowds 
into the violent clashes they expected. In this situation, another method was used: three 
governors of eastern oblasts started to blackmail Yushchenko with the possible creation 
of a ‘South-Eastern autonomous republic’, and the Kharkiv governor even declared he 
would refuse to make payments to the state budget. The Yushchenko team immediately 
accused Yanukovych supporters of separatism and demanded that Kuchma act as the 
guarantor of Ukrainian territorial integrity. Many local authorities did not side with the 
separatist factions. In fact, Yushchenko won not only in the west, but also in the center of 
the country. He moved to northeastern Chernihiv and Sumy regions, and according to 
exit polls, won in the southern Kherson oblast. In the Ukrainian capital he officially 
secured 75 percent of the vote. Even oligarchs supporting Kuchma (such as Pinchuk and 
Akhmetov, the main business figure behind Yanukovych) were not interested in splitting 
the country, as their access to world markets would suffer.  
The Verkhovna Rada firmly denounced separatism, declaring on November 27th that 
the results of the run-off were distorted, expressing non-confidence in the CEC and then, 
on December 1st, in Yanukovych’s government. It was a great moral victory for 
Yushchenko.      
Kuchma and his entourage also tried once again to immediately push through the 
constitutional reform aimed at stripping Yushchenko of real power. In turn, Yushchenko 
repeated his original position: his team is in favor of adopting reform now, while 
implementing it only in 2006 when the new parliamentary election would take place. 
Now the Ukrainian political system is more open and pluralistic than in other post-Soviet 
countries, and there is a trend towards greater responsibility of the parliament. It is clear 
that under Yushchenko an opposition will continue to exist (contrary to expectations 
about Yanukovych policy) and will actively participate in the 2006 parliamentary 
election.        
On November 29th, the Supreme Court of Ukraine began an examination of 
Yushchenko’s complaint on the decision of the CEC. The live broadcast of its session 
revealed the scale of falsifications to the country and to the international community. 
International mediators including the EU High Representative for the Common Security 
and Foreign Policy Javier Solana, Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski, OSCE 
Secretary General Jan Kubish, and Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus also played an 
important role in persuading Kuchma, Yushchenko and Yanukovych to wait until the 
Supreme Court made a final decision about elections.  
The speaker of the Russian Duma, Boris Gryzlov, also participated in these 
negotiations. However, Russia’s position appeared quite dubious, as Putin congratulated 
Yanukovych with victory even before the CEC announced its decision (while even 
Kuchma refrained).   
Kuchma and Putin were eager to have a new presidential campaign from the very 
beginning. It seems that it was initially considered an ideal scenario by Kuchma’s 
administration, although they did not expect such strong protests from Ukrainians as well 
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as from the international community. On the contrary, the opposition and the West 
insisted on repeating the run-off. Putin’s position has already increased anti-Russian 
sentiments in Ukraine. Therefore, if Russia continues to interfere with the Ukrainian 
electoral process, it may eventually lead to the undermining of Russian-Ukrainian 
relations and the interests of Russian business in Ukraine. 
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